ABSTRACT This paper investigates the privacy preservation issue of distributed dc optimal power flow (OPF) methods while considering the line capacity constraints in smart grids with radial topology. We show that private information, such as the local energy consumption, local power generation, and parameters in the local cost function can be possibly exposed in traditional OPF methods without proper privacy preserving mechanism. Then we design a privacy-preserving alternating direction method of multipliers based distributed OPF algorithm by adding stochastic noise into the communication messages between neighbor buses, and the analysis on the convergence and optimality of the proposed algorithm is provided. Extensive simulations on a nine-bus power system validate the theoretical results and demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart grid, which is a typical complex cyber-physical system (CPS) [1] , employs advanced technology in communication, computing and control to enhance the efficiency, stability and security of the traditional power system [2] - [5] . Optimal power flow (OPF) has been one key function in the power system operation since firstly formulated in 1962 [6] . The fundamental goal of OPF is to determine the optimal generation output of the whole smart grid which minimizes a global objective such as the generation costs and energy losses while satisfying certain physical and economic constraints. Traditionally, the OPF problem is calculated in a centralized manner, where all the necessary parameters and measurements are collected by a leader node such as the independent system operator (ISO). In recent years, with increasing penetrations of distributed energy resources and a more distributed infrastructure, the distributed OPF methods have gained increasing attention in the literature [7] . Most of the distributed OPF methods adopt iterative algorithm structure and abandon the existence of leader node, where each bus in the power network performs the local calculation and exchanges coordination message to achieve the global optimality [8] , [9] .
However, existing distributed OPF methods fail to protect the privacy information of participating buses, such as the local energy consumption, local power generation and parameters in the local cost function. Specifically, in most of the distributed methods, the exchanged message could potentially expose the local power generation and private parameters along with the iteration [10] , [11] . The private information mentioned above is essential for the participating buses. Their economic interests will be violated if this private information is obtained by malicious adversaries or competitors. And for electricity users, the fine-grained data of power demand could reveal the residents' occupation and living habits [12] - [15] .
Only a few works have been done to address the privacy preserving issue in the distributed OPF problem. Mandal et al. [16] proposed a privacy preserving consensusbased economic dispatch algorithm based on secure summation communication protocol so that information-theoretical privacy can be achieved. Zhao et al. [10] designed a distributed privacy preserving energy management algorithm by adding carefully designed zero-sum and exponentially decreasing noises to the exchanged messages, while the optimality and convergence can be guaranteed. However, these works all study a simplified OPF model and only generation-demand balance constraint is taken into consideration. Yang et al. [17] proposed a centralized privacy preserving OPF algorithm via injecting Gaussian noise at the customer end so that Differential Privacy (DP) can be achieved, whereas the optimality of the final solution is sacrificed and some private parameters are still need to be collected by the leader node. The introduction of DP, which is originally developed by Dwork et al. [18] to prevent privacy leakage of database queries, makes it convenient to quantify the privacy-preserving level. However, to the best of our knowledge, most of the methods adopting DP suffer from suboptimality and low convergence rate due to the added Laplacian or Gaussian noise [19] - [22] , which is unacceptable for the operation of essential infrastructure like smart grid.
In this paper, we propose a privacy preserving ADMM-based DC-OPF algorithm while considering the line capacity constraints in the power network. The contribution of this work are threefold: 1) We provide a typical ADMM-based DC-OPF algorithm for power network with radial topology, and analyze the potential privacy leakage. 2) We propose a privacy preserving ADMM-based OPF algorithm by adding stochastic noisy signals to the exchanged messages between buses, and prove the optimality and convergence of the proposed algorithm. 3) Simulations and evaluations are done to show the validity of the theoretical analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first briefly introduce a traditional ADMM-based DC-OPF algorithm applied for power network with radial topology in Section II and present the potential privacy leakage in Section III. Then we propose a privacy preserving ADMMbased DC-OPF algorithm in Section IV. Simulations on a 9-bus power system are done to show the validity of the proposed method in Section V and conclusions are drawn along with some possible future directions in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a power network of n buses, including n g generation buses and n d load buses. The communication network of the power system is represented by a connected graph [23] G = {V, E} with radial topology, where V denotes the set of buses in the power network, and E denotes the set of power lines. By connected graph, we mean that any two buses in the graph are connected by at least one path and there are no unreachable buses. Let V g and V d denote the set of generation buses and set of load buses, respectively. And N i denotes the set of neighbor buses of bus i, E i denotes the set of power lines connecting to bus i. Then the optimal power flow problem can be formulated as [24] :
where a i , b i and c i are the parameters in the cost function of generation bus i, X ij is the reactance of power line indexed by ij that connects bus i and bus j (we do not consider self loops in this paper, i.e. X ii does not exist), P max ij is the flow limit of power line ij, P min g,i and P max g,i denote the minimum and maximum generator output of generation bus i. The objective of OPF problem is to decide the global optimal generation dispatches that minimize the total cost of the whole power system, where the operation constraints are comprehensively considered, including the power balance constraints (2), the power line capacity constraints (3), and generation capacity constraints (4) . It can be seen that the generation capacity constraints (4) in Problem (1) are local constraints, whereas the the power balance constraints (2) and power line capacity constraints (3) are coupling constraints, which means that one bus has to know the states of its neighbors to check whether these constraints are satisfied.
The primal optimal power flow problem can also be converted to another form (detailed problem transformation can be found in Appendix A):
− P max ij
where i → j is assume to be the positive direction of power flow, P ij is the decision variable denoting the power flow from bus i to bus j, P i,ij and P j,ij are local copy of decision variables P ij of bus i and j, and P ij can be treated as an auxiliary variable imposing the consensus constraint on neighboring buses i and j.
In this paper, we provide an ADMM-based algorithm to solve the OPF problem in a decentralized iterative way. Define the decomposed Lagrangian of bus i in the kth iteration as below:
where f i (x i ) represents the local objective function of bus i, u i,ij denotes the bus i's Lagrangian Multiplier corresponding to constraint (9) , and ρ is a global parameter to tune the convergence rate. Let λ denote the vector of Lagrangian Multipliers, then the ADMM-based distributed OPF algorithm can be summarized as Algorithm 1 (detailed derivation of Algorithm 1 can be found in Appendix B). The convergence property and optimality can be guaranteed by the following theorem.
Algorithm 1 ADMM-Based Distributed OPF Input: the local power demand P d,i and algorithm parameter c > 0; Output: the optimal generation output P * d,i ; 1: initialize the variables as x 0 = 0 and λ 0 = 0; 2: repeat 3: in the kth iteration, each bus solves the sub-problem:
and sends P k i,ij to its corresponding neighbor bus. After receiving P k j,ij from its neighbor, bus i updates the Lagrangian Multipliers as
until the difference between two adjacent iteration results is smaller than a threshold or the iteration number reaches a pre-specified value. 5: Return the optimal generation output as (5) is feasible, the Algorithm 1 can converge to the optimal value (x * , λ * ) when k → ∞.
Theorem 1: When Problem
We provide the detailed proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix C.
III. PRIVACY LEAKAGE
In this paper, we assume the attacker could be 1) a semihonest node in the communication network that strictly follow the protocol but analyze the exchanged message to obtain additional information [10] , [16] , or 2) a eavesdropper that can collect all the communication message in the network [10] . We also assume the local demand P d,i can be revealed to the malicious attackers [16] . The privacy information we consider here is twofold, including 1) the generation outputs and 2) parameters of the cost functions. Specifically, the leakage of generation outputs may bring financial losses to the power plant. For instance, if one power plant obtains the generation output of others in a competitive market, it can generate more electricity to oust its competitors during peak hour. Meanwhile, the parameters a i , b i and c i in the cost functions are also private information. Similarly in a competitive market, if one generator's parameters are revealed to others, its cost function will be revealed to its competitors, thus that they could announce a lower operation costs for vicious competition.
For Algorithm 1, the only information that two arbitrary neighbor buses need to exchange in the kth iteration is the local decision variable P k i,ij , hence a powerful attacker can get P i,ij , ∀ij ∈ E i by eavesdropping all the communication links of bus i [10] . This could happen in the practical scenarios, because the increasing deployment of smart devices also comes with numerous vulnerabilities. For example, researchers demonstrated how to hack a smart meter through quick memory acquisition techniques and hardware bus sniffing in DEFCON 2012, which exposed the vulnerability of smart meters. Furthermore, the parameter a i and b i can also be potentially inferred through analyzing the communication information. Specifically, consider a simplified scenario where certain bus i has only one neighbor bus j. Then the optimal solution of problem (10) in iteration k will be
if the P k i,ij is within the feasible region constrained by (6), (7) and (8) . If the attacker can get these results of arbitrary two iteration k and k , he can derive the parameter a i and b i reversely by simply solving two linearly independent equations.
IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED OPF
In this section, we will propose a privacy preserving distributed OPF algorithm by adding carefully designed noisy signals and analyze the privacy preserving performance of the proposed algorithm.
A. ALGORITHM DESIGN
Let the superscript ∼ denote the sign of adding noise and w k i,ij denote the noisy signal adding to P k i,ij in kth iteration,
Furthermore, inspired by [25] , we introduce a secret continuous function F i,ij (z) : R → R for bus i that is only available to node i and its neighbor bus j, and generally speaking F i,ij (z) = F j,ij (z). To protect the final decision variables and parameters in the cost function of each bus while guaranteeing the convergence as well as optimality, we add exponentially decreasing noise signal and the value of continuous function to P k i,ij in every iteration. The details are given in Algorithm 2. The noisy version of Lagrangian L i is defined as:
In Algorithm 2, the introduction of secret function F i,ij (z) is to prevent the leakage of the final optimal decision variable P * i,ij due to the assumption that F i,ij (z) can be only available to node i and its corresponding neighbor bus j. The noisy signal k v k i,ij is added to prevent malicious eavesdroppers or curious neighbor buses from inferring the private parameters a i and b i in the objective function. 
to its neighbor j. 4: repeat 5: in the kth iteration, each bus solves the sub-problem: (7), (8) ( 12) selects a uniform distribution random variable v k i,ij from [−σ, σ ], and sends
to its corresponding neighbor bus, where ∈ (0, 1) is a constant scalar and k denotes the k power of . After receiving P k j,ij from its neighbor, bus i updates the Lagrangian Multipliers as
6: until the difference between two adjacent iteration results is smaller than a threshold or the iteration number reaches a pre-specified value. 7: Return the optimal generation output as
The convergence and optimality of Algorithm 2 can be guaranteed by theorem 2.
Theorem 2: When Problem (5) is feasible and the Lagrangian Multipliers u k i,ij are bounded for ∀i, ij and k, Algorithm 2 can converge to the optimal value (x * , λ * ) when k → ∞.
Detailed proof can be found in Appendix D.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In Algorithm 1, when one bus has zero power demand or the local demand is disclosed by some side information, the local power generation can be calculated by (6) when a malicious attacker obtains all the optimal power flow connected to the bus. However, in Algorithm 2, the optimal power flow P * i,ij will not be revealed to extraneous eavesdroppers under the second attack model due to the assumption that F i,ij (z i,ij ) FIGURE 1. 9-bus system. is only available for bus i and j. Besides, when the bus has multiple neighbors or the local power demand is not disclosed, its neighbor cannot obtain all the necessary information to calculate P g,i , thus that the local power generation can be kept private under the first attack model.
For protection on parameters of local cost functions, we consider a worst case to demonstrate the privacy preserving performance, where all the neighbors collude to infer the private parameters a i , b i and the local power demand P d,i is exposed through side information. For that each neighbor knows the corresponding secure function F i,ij (z i,ij ), the secure functions become invalid. Then in iteration k, we have
when the optimal value in this iteration is within the feasible region, where l . . . j ∈ N i . In the equations above, the added noisy signal k v k i,ij and the private parameters a i , b i are unknown to the collusion neighbors. Assume they totally get the results of m iterations, there will be m · |N i | equations and m·|N i |+2 unknowns in the meanwhile. Therefore, the collusion neighbors cannot obtain the precise private parameters. For scenarios where non-colluded neighbors and extraneous eavesdroppers are considered, Algorithm 2 can also protect the private information due to that the attack will always get less information than the worst case considered above.
V. SIMULATION
In this section, a modified 9-bus system from MATPOWER library case 9 will be studied to verify the validity of theoretical results. The system, as shown in Fig. 1, has 3 generation buses, 3 load buses and a radial topology, and the corresponding parameters of each generator are set as TABLE 1. The default decaying factor of the noisy signal is set as = 0.8, and the default magnitude is set as σ = 100.
We first show the convergence and optimality of Algorithm 2 through Fig. 2 and 3. Fig 2 shows the iteration process of the total generation cost computed as (5), and 3 shows the iteration process of P 1,14 , which is bus 1's local copy of the power flow from bus 1 to bus 4. It can be seen that Algorithm 2 can return the optimal value under varying settings of σ . We also evaluate the effect of on the convergence and optimality of the proposed algorithm. As Fig. 4 shows, the convergence and optimality can be guaranteed under varying settings of . Besides, a larger decaying factor will generally reduce the convergence speed, but bring higher privacy preserving level on the other hand, which will be shown in the followings.
Then we evaluate the privacy preserving performance of the proposed algorithm. We take bus 1 as an extreme case for that it has only one neighbor bus, i.e., bus 4. From equation (11), we know that bus 4 can reconstruct bus 1's private parameters a 1 Fig. 5(b) and 5(c) shows. As a result, a 1 and b 1 cannot be reconstructed precisely by bus 4 with only the knowledge of P 1,14 , let alone the malicious eavesdroppers in the communication network. Thus the private parameters are prevented from getting by both semi-honest buses and malicious eavesdroppers. It also can be seen from Fig. 5 that a larger decaying factor will lead to a worsened linear relationship, which indicates a better privacy preserving level. In other words, the malicious attackers will have lower possibility to reconstruct the precise sensitive parameters with a larger .
In order to demonstrate the privacy protection performance in a more intuitive method, we use mutual information to quantify the privacy preserving level [26] . Mutual information is widely used to measure the dependence between the two random variables X and Y . Generally speaking, the mutual information between X and Y becomes zero when they are mutually independent, and a larger mutual information indicates that X and Y share more information with each other. In the OPF scenario, we adopt the mutual information between P 1,14 and u
4,14 ) to evaluate the privacy protection performance as Fig. 6 shows, out of the observation that these two variables are almost linearly dependent without any privacy preserving mechanism. From Fig. 6 , it can be seen that larger noise amplitude σ and decaying factor will bring better privacy protection performance.
Furthermore, we stand in the attacker's perspective to estimate the parameter a 1 through classical linear regression method. Letâ 1 denote the estimated value of parameter a 1 by observing sequences P 1,14 and u where num is the total number of running the simulation. Here we set num = 10. From Fig. 7 , we can seen that the attacker's estimation accuracy declines dramatically under larger σ and , which shows that the proposed method can protect the private parameters effectively.
When we treat the final decision value, i.e., P * i,ij as the private information, adding the decaying noise to the communication message only fail to protect because the added noise inclines to zero along with the iteration. In this case, the secure function is brought in to protect this kind of private information. In the simulation, we set the secure function as F i,ij (z) = j · z + i. Fig. 8 illustrates the validity of the secure function, where the blue line denotes the exchanged data sent from bus 1 to bus 4 and the red line represents the local copy of the decision variables of every iteration. It can be seen that an extraneous eavesdropper in the network cannot get the final decision variable thanks to the secure function, and the neighbor bus 4 can recover the P 1, 14 for that the specific value of secure function F 1,14 (z 1,14 ) is only available to bus 1 and 4. Besides, the secure function is only needed to be communicated in a secure way once before the distributed computing, thus that the communication overhead is relatively smaller than traditional cryptography methods.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the privacy preserving issue of distributed DC-OPF methods while considering the line capacity constraints in smart grids with radial topology. A privacy preserving ADMM-based OPF algorithm is proposed and the corresponding convergence as well as optimality is analyzed. Simulations on a 9-bus system are performed to show the validity of the theoretical results. Future work will consider a power system with a more general topology or time-varying topology [27] , and privacy preserving issue of complex AC-OPF methods will also be investigated.
APPENDIX A PROBLEM TRANSFORMATION
Here we first define a new decision variable as
to denote the power flow from bus i to bus j. The the primal problem can be rewritten as:
Through the above conversion, the decision variable becomes P ij instead of θ i , which means that one bus has to negotiate with its neighbor buses to jointly decide a final line power flow. Besides, for arbitrary two neighbor buses, there is:
Assume every power lines in the network are assigned a positive direction. The positive direction can be decided by the Independent System Operator (ISO) or simply by the two buses that this power line connects. Then the decision variables of bus i will be the power line flows relative to the positive direction for all power lines in E i . Thus, the converted OPF problem (5) can be obtained.
APPENDIX B DERIVATION OF ALGORITHM 1
Let x i denote the vector whose elements are all the local decision variables P i,ij of bus i, and z denote vector whose elements are all the auxiliary variables P ij in the network. Define f (x) as:
where x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i , . . . , x n ) T . Then the problem (5) can be written in the form of ADMM as:
s.t. (6) , (7), (8),
where g(z) = 0, A ∈ R 2|E|×2|E| , B ∈ R 2|E|×|E| , and Ax + Bz = 0 is the matrix form of the consensus constraints (9) . We can write down the Lagrangian of problem (18) as:
where ρ is a positive scalar and λ is the corresponding Lagrangian Multiplier vector. According to the classical ADMM algorithm, the iteration process is:
where the superscript k is the index of iteration number. For iteration (20) , z k+1 can be obtained by solving the following linear equation:
because there is no constraint on the auxiliary variable z. By multiplying the two side of equation (21) with B T and adding the result to equation (22), we can obtain:
Furthermore, for a pair of constraints P i,ij = P ij and P j,ij = P ij , let u i,ij and u j,ij denote the corresponding Lagrangian Multipliers in λ. According equation (23) and the structure of B T , the equation (23) is equivalent to:
And the corresponding equation elements in (21) is:
It can be observed that, if the initial value of u i,ij and u j,ij are selected as u 0 i,ij + u 0 j,ij = 0 and the iteration process of z is designed as
there holds:
In this paper, we adopt a simplified initialization as x 0 = 0 and λ 0 = 0. Then the original ADMM iteration process can be reduced to a simplified algorithm that only involves the x update and Lagrangian Multiplier update. Thus Algorithm 1 can be obtained.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Let the superscript * denote the sign of optimal value and X denote the set constrained by (6), (7) and (8) . According to the assumptions that Problem (5) 
Due to the strong duality, there is:
which implies:
According to Algorithm 1, each bus solve the corresponding subproblem, in other words:
= arg min
where the third equality is due to the fact that the second and the third optimization problem share the same first order optimality condition. Furthermore, since
there is:
Due to that x k+1 i solves the above problem optimally, we can obtain:
Since r
By summing up the above inequality of all buses, there is:
And based on (24), we have:
Combining the above two inequalities, we can obtain:
Concatenate (25) and (26): (27) where
Define the Lyapunov function as:
Then we can obtain:
where
Then we have:
Because V 0 is bounded, we can draw the conclusion that r i,ij → 0 and P k+1 ij → P k ij when k → ∞. And due to (25) and (26) , f (x k ) → f (x * ) when k → ∞. Thus the Algorithm 1 can converge to the optimal value.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to Algorithm 2, the secure functions F i,ij (·) and F j,ij (·) can only be available to bus i and j, so they can be removed after receiving the noisy iteration result, i.e., P k j,ij can be obtained by bus i, while the eavesdropper can only obtain
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we can obtain:
which is equivalent to
where 
which is equivalent to: Besides, similar conclusion with (24) can be draw as: When u k i,ij is bounded for ∀i, ij and k, it can be proven that the terms − P * ij ) are bounded because P k i,ij , P k ij are physically bounded by (7)- (9), and w k i,ij , w k +,ij are exponentially decreasing. Therefore, the Algorithm 2 will converge to the optimal point. VOLUME 6, 2018 
